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Abstract - Security experts, web developers, hackers 
sometimes use Web Vulnerability Scanners (WVSs) for 
identifying vulnerabilities in web applications. There are 
commercial and free/open source WVSs, and nowadays, many 
companies offer WVSs as services. In this paper, we test and 
evaluate 3 free/open source WVSs and 4 free, trial or regular 
editions of commercial WVSs using two versions of our one 
created trading web application. One version has SQL Injection 
and XSS vulnerabilities as critical, and the other version is free 
from these vulnerabilities. Results are showing that most of the 
scanners pollute the backend database with many garbage 
records using user input fields for obtaining user’s opinion, 
comments, rating, etc., independently of the presence or absence 
of given critical vulnerabilities. In our experiment, garbage 
records were injected as comments for ads, and the magnitude of 
pollution goes more than 50 times the number of ads in the 
database in the worst case.  Also, some scanners manage to find 
the implemented vulnerabilities without producing garbage 
records.  
Keywords—Web Vulnerability Scanners, backend database, 
garbage records 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Web Application Security Scanners (WASSs) or Web 
Vulnerability Scanners (WVSs) are a type of security 
software, most commonly used by website owners, security 
experts and hackers, to perform identification of potential 
vulnerabilities in the web applications, independent of the 
particular technology used for their implementation. They 
access the web applications in the same manner as user does, 
through the web front-end. Usually they are black-box testers, 
because they do not have access to the source code. 
Vulnerability detection mechanisms and scans differ in 
different WVSs, from looking at registry entries in MS 
Windows operating systems to see if a specific patch or update 
has been implemented, modifying URLs to check for 
sanitization issues or discover known vulnerabilities, to 
actually performing attacks on detecting vulnerabilities. The 
OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) Top Ten 
2013 vulnerability list [14] is often used as a minimum 
standard for website vulnerability assessment and PCI 
compliance according to the Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard (PCI DSS) [9], so performing web 
vulnerability scans is a necessity for PCI compliance. 
Additionally, the usefulness of WVSs comes from automatically 
and cost-effective conduction of security checks and production 
of the final report, which often includes a remedy for found 
vulnerability. 
On the other side, WVSs are not a silver bullet, capable of 
detecting all of the possible vulnerabilities and attack vectors 
that exist. There are several reports showing that today WVSs 
fail to detect a significant number of vulnerabilities in test 
applications [2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15].  
Another big issue about WVSs is can they harm in any 
way tested web sites? Black box scanners have tendency to 
perform invasive scans, which sometimes can cause email 
floods, as well as publishing of garbage blog posts, garbage 
comments, ratings, etc [1]. Grossman [6] shares their 
experiences from ten years of scanning tens of thousands of 
real-live websites of all shapes and sizes. He gives the 
following 7 ways how some WVSs can harm scanned web 
site: 
 Following “Sensitive” Hyperlinks – some web sites have 
hyperlinks (GET requests) that, when clicked, execute 
backend functionality that deletes data, cancel orders, 
remits payment, removes user accounts, disables 
functionality, and etc. 
 Automatically Testing “Sensitive” Web Forms –
sometimes submission of a Web form (POST request) 
may generate emails to customer support, execute 
computationally expensive backend processes, direct 
submitted data that will be visible to other users, and so 
on. This can result in spamming inboxes with thousands 
of emails, taking down the website due to resource load, 
negatively impacting the user experience of the entire 
user-base by showing them unexpected data, and costing 
the company large sums of money 
 Poorly Designed Vulnerability Tests – during 
dynamically testing, various meta-character strings are 
put into input fields, URLs, POST bodies, headers, 
etc. Website can be harmed when it mistakes meta-
characters for executable code. 
 Connection Denial of Service (DoS) – sometimes 
scanning requires sending hundreds of requests 
simultaneously to the website, so this can easily exhaust a 
website’s available connection pool and render the system 
unable to serve legitimate visitors.  
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 Session Exhaustion DoS – complete testing a website 
requires that vulnerability scans are run in an 
authenticated state. When WVS logs in hundreds of times 
during testing, it may consume all the website’s session 
credential resources, and no additional legitimate users 
can log-in, until the session credential garbage collection 
is conducted. 
 CPU DoS – some websites have computationally 
expensive hyperlinks, which during the scans may be 
clicked a large number of times, contrary to what was 
expected, and consume all of a websites available CPU 
resources.  
 Verbose Logging and Run-Time Error – scanning can 
involve a large number of abnormal requests, which could 
raise various backend application exceptions and verbose 
run-time error logging. Because of this, the disk size of 
the logs generated and stored could be substantial. 
 
Consequently, the vulnerability scans need to be 
performed with precautions, and, ideally, a replica of the live 
environment should be created in a test lab, so if something 
goes wrong, only the replica is affected.  At least, before 
starting scans, latest backups are needed. Some automated 
scanners include settings for launching a non-invasive scans, 
but these kind of scans will only launch some very basic 
“security" checks against the target, such as text searches, file 
checks, version checks and some other basic tests, which 
typically do not lead to a malicious defacement of the site or 
web application. So, invasive scans are necessary, because if 
an automated WVS can break down tested website, a 
malicious user can do even worse.  
In this paper, we try to measure the amount of generated 
garbage records per scan, by testing 3 free/open source WVSs 
and 4 free, trial or regular editions of commercial WVSs, with 
consideration of scanner’s capability to detect several basic 
critical/important vulnerabilities. We want to see is it possible 
to detect these vulnerabilities, with performing non-invasive 
scans, in the sense that scanners do not leave any garbage 
records. Also, it was interesting to see if the pollution of 
database obtained by scanning, depends on the presence or 
absence of these vulnerabilities in the web application. After 
Introduction, Section II gives the basic architecture of the 
black box WVSs. In Section III we give a brief explanation of 
two versions of used testbed web application and seven WVSs 
with their general characteristics and input vector support, 
followed by used methodology, obtained results on the 
measured number of garbage records, and discussion. At the 
end, we give short concluding remarks. 
 
II. BLACK BOX WEB VULNERABILITY SCANNERS 
Generally, the core of the WVSs is made up from three 
main components: a crawling component, an attacker 
component and an analysis component.  
First, the user enters at least one URL, with or without 
user credentials for the given web application, and then the 
crawling component identifies all the reachable pages in the 
application, and all the input points to the application. After 
the user sets the scanning profile, the scanner can proceed 
automatically or by user interaction. We used only automated 
mode for our experiments. 
Once the crawling component finishes its job, the next 
components perform analysis of the discovered data, and for 
each web form, for each input and for each vulnerability type 
for which the WVS has test vectors, the component generates 
values that are likely to trigger a vulnerability. Then, the form 
content is sent to the web server as an HTTP request, and after 
processing the request, the server sends back a response via 
HTTP. 
The attacker component analyzes discovered data and for 
each web form, for each input and for each vulnerability type 
for which the WVS has test vectors, the attacker module 
generates values that are likely to trigger a vulnerability. Then, 
the form content is sent to the web server using either a GET 
or POST request, and appropriate response is obtained from 
the server via HTTP. 
Finally, the analysis component performs parsing and 
interpreting the server response. Decision if a given attack was 
successful is made by calculation of confidence value, by 
implementing attack-specific response criteria and keywords.  
 
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
A. Testbed Web Application 
We created a simple trading web application, where 
unregistered users can list ads, see information and description 
about individual ad, comment on the ad and so on. Registered 
users can add ads and manage ads. We created two versions of 
the application, a vulnerable and a safe one. The vulnerable 
version is affected by SQL injection (in 3 scripts), reflected 
and stored XSS vulnerabilities.  
The web server hosting our web applications run on 64-bit 
Windows 8.1 Enterprise operating system. The following 
technologies are used: Apache server version 2.4.4, PHP 
version 5.4.12 and MySQL version 5.6.12. 
 
B. Tested Web Vulnerabilities Scanners 
The scanners were run on a machine with an Intel (R) Core 
(TM) i7-3632QM 2 x 2.20GHz CPU, 6 GB of RAM, and 64-
bit Windows 8. 
Table 1 lists the seven WVSs used in our study and their 
general characteristics. All have a graphical user interface and 
support for proxy mode (manual crawling). Three of them, 
NetSparker Community Edition, N-Stalker X Free Edition and 
Acunetix WVS run only on Windows, and other four can be 
installed on Linux and OS X also. Only N-Stalker X Free 
Edition, OWASP ZAP and IBM Rational AppScan can 
produce a report. Their input vector support is given in Table 
2. Many different characteristic comparisons with older 
versions of these WVSs can be found on Chen’s web site 
SecToolMarket [3]. 
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Free NetSparker Community Edition has many features 
disabled, compared to its commercial version, but still you can 
scan and exploit SQL injection and XSS vulnerabilities 
without any false-positives.  
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Version 3.1 X-build 2.2.2 2013 beta 1.0 9 7.8 































Report No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Scan Log Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
N-Stalker X Free Edition provides a restricted set of 
features, compared to its commercial version, and will inspect 
up to 100 pages within the target application. It offers a 
restricted version of the N - Stealth Database, web server 
security check, reduced analysis of web signature attacks, etc.  
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HTTP Query String Parameters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HTTP Body Parameters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HTTP Cookie Parameters Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
HTTP Headers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HTTP Parameter Names    Yes   Yes 
XML Element Content Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
XML Attributes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
XML Tags        
JSON Parameters Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Flash Action Message Format       Yes 
Custom Input Vector    Yes   Yes 
SUMMARY 7 4 6 9 3 7 10 
 
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) is a free and open 
source, easy to use, integrated scanning and penetration testing 
tool, and it is designed to be used by people with a wide range 
of security experience. ZAP includes intercepting proxy, 
active and passive scanners, traditional and Ajax spiders, 
WebSocket support, fuzzing, forced browsing, port scanner, 
script console, etc. 
IronWASP (Iron Web application Advanced Security 
testing Platform) is a free and open source tool, created by 
Lavakumar Kuppan. It offers full and semi-automated scans, 
JavaScript static analysis, scripting shell for Python and Ruby 
giving full access to the IronWASP framework, and this can 
be used by the pen testers to write their own fuzzers, create 
custom crafted request, analysis of logs, etc. Another its 
strength is the possibility of using different external libraries 
like IronPython, IronRuby, FiddleCore, etc. 
Vega is a free and open source automated scanner for 
quick tests and an intercepting proxy for tactical inspection. 
For this test we are using fully functional 14-day trial 
version of Acunetix WVS. This scanner uses AcuSensor 
Technology, and besides scanning, it offers advanced 
penetration testing tools. 
IBM Rational AppScan, now known as IBM Security 
AppScan, is a family of web security testing and monitoring 
tools from the IBM. For our tests, we used older version of 
IBM Rational AppScan. 
 
C. Methodology 
In our experiments, scanners were run without logging, 
and only the default values for configuration parameters were 
used. Only N-Stalker X Free Edition was run with OWASP 
policy.  
Backend database consists of 3 tables, with initially 3 
users, 7 ads, and no comments.  After every scanning we 
summed the number of garbage comments in the database 
generated by the scanner and the number of affected ads, and 
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by deleting the comments, we prepare the database for the 
next scan. For every scanner we made 3 scans on the web 
applications. 
D. Results and discussion 
Table 3 shows the capabilities of tested WVSs for finding 
critical/important vulnerabilities. We need this to see how 
leaving garbage comments is connected with this capability. 
Only N-Stalker X Free Edition cannot find SQL vulnerability, 
and OWASP ZAP cannot find reflected XSS. (2/3) means that 
the scanner had identified only two of three vulnerable scripts. 
TABLE 3:  FOUNDED CRITICAL/IMPORTANT VULNERABILITIES 
 






Yes (3/3) Yes Yes 
N-Stalker X 
Free Edition  Yes Yes 
OWASP 
ZAP Yes (2/3)  Yes 
IronWASP Yes (2/3) Yes Yes 
Vega Yes (3/3) Yes Yes 
Acunetix  




Yes (2/3) Yes Yes 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 give the number of garbage 
comments produced by the tested scanners in 3 independent 
scans on the safe and the vulnerable test application, 
respectfully.  
TABLE 4:  NUMBER OF GARBAGE COMMENTS FOR THE SAFE TESTBED WEB 
APPLICATION FOR 3 SCANS 
 
Number of garbage comments Ads 
 




156 160 156 All 
N-Stalker X 
Free Edition 26 26 26 All 
OWASP 
ZAP 61 61 61 All 
IronWASP 0 0 0 - 
Vega 0 0 0 - 
Acunetix  




52 52 51 All 
 
One can see, that these numbers, ranges from 0 to 367 for 
the safe web application and from 0 to 180 for the vulnerable 
web application, and that for all scanners that produce garbage 
comments, all ads are affected. This means that if our database 
have thousands or more adds, which is the situation in reality, 
one scan with these scanners will produce at least the same 
number of the garbage comments. Two scanners, IronWASP 
and Vega, do not leave any garbage comments, but are 
capable of finding given vulnerabilities (IronWASP find 2 of 3 
vulnerable scripts for SQLI). These results mean that some 
WVS can find tested critical/important vulnerability, without 
necessity to use invasive techniques. Nothing can be 
concluded about finding other vulnerabilities without invasive 
scans.  
TABLE 5:  NUMBER OF GARBAGE COMMENTS FOR THE VULNERABLE TESTBED 
WEB APPLICATION FOR 3 SCANS 
 
Number of garbage comments Ads 
 




156 150 156 All 
N-Stalker X 
Free Edition 10 10 10 All 
OWASP 
ZAP 210 210 210 All 
Iron 
WASP 0 0 0 - 
Vega 0 0 0 - 
Acunetix  




178 178 180 All 
 
Acunetix WVS leaves most garbage comments for the 
safe web application, with a magnitude of more than 50 times 
larger than the number of ads in the tested database. OWASP 
ZAP leaves most garbage comments for the vulnerable web 
application - 30 times larger than the number of ads in the 
tested database. 
The experiments also show that WVSs that create garbage 
records, do that even when web application is free from 
critical/important vulnerabilities. Some WVSs, like N-Stalker 
X Free Edition, OWASP ZAP and Acunetix WVS produce 
more garbage comments for the safe web application, while 
IBM Rational AppScan produces more garbage comments for 
the vulnerable web application. First behavior is easier to 
understand, and can be explained that WVS stop testing the 
script on giving vulnerability, after it found it.  
Also, some scanners, like NetSparker Community Edition 
and IBM Rational AppScan produce different numbers of 
garbage comments, but with small deviation, for scanning the 
same web application.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Our experiments show that different scanners produce 
different numbers of garbage records in the backend database, 
and because of that, when we use them for scanning, web 
administrators need to make a backup of their database. This 
can protect them from spending additional time after scanning, 
for cleaning the database. Also, our experiments show that 
some scanners have capabilities of finding tested 
critical/important vulnerabilities, without using invasive 
techniques that produce garbage records. WVSs that produce 
garbage records, do that regardless of presence of a given 
vulnerability in the web application. 
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